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With the aid of computerized sentiment analysis, this paper analyzes the role of constituents' 
comment letters in the process of setting international financial reporting standards for 
financial instruments. Whilst explicit agreement in comment letters is associated with the 
board's decision to proceed with their proposed course of action, we find no consistent 
evidence that explicitly stated disagreement has an impact on the resulting accounting 
standard. Using context specific dictionaries, we find that increased levels of negative tone in 
comment letters increases the probability of the board subsequently abandoning a proposed 
course of action. Capturing dissent through negative tone facilitates large-scale analysis and 
we show that the financial industry has been less successful in its lobbying efforts through 
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1. Introduction  
In this paper, we study the influence of constituents in international accounting standard 
setting. Specifically, we examine the influence of negativity in comment letters sent to the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to try to evaluate the responsiveness of the 
IASB to lobbying at this stage in the standard setting process.  
The relationship between a standard setter’s decision-making and the views of its 
constituents has been of interest since the seminal work of Zeff (1978) which shows the 
standard setting process to be a largely political exercise rather than purely technical. This 
view is supported by a large body of accounting research on the lobbying of standard setters 
around the World.1 Despite this extensive body of work, there have been renewed calls for 
research to develop a greater understanding of lobbying and international accounting standard 
setting, as not enough is known about this process (Kothari, Ramanna, & Skinner, 2010). For 
example, the IASB issued standards for financial instruments that were widely opposed by 
the business community (Larson & Street, 2004) and which policy makers came to blame for 
causing contagion in the financial crisis leading to power struggles between the IASB and 
political bodies e.g. the European Union (Bengtsson, 2011). These political struggles in 
accounting standard setting motivates the purpose of our study, namely to shed light on how 
the IASB responds to its constituents’ dissent within its due process.  
Ramanna (2015, p. 6) states: “it is imperative that from time-to-time we engage in a 
systematic evaluation of the political process”.  We aim to answer this call by analyzing the 
IASB’s development of standards for financial instruments. We recognize that the IASB has 
its own ideological preferences that are at times at odds with those of its constituents. 
                                                 
1
For example Ang, Sidhu, & Gallery, 2000; L. D. Brown & Feroz, 1992; Chee Chiu Kwok & Sharp, 2005; 
Coombes & Stokes, 1985; Francis, 1987; Georgiou, 2010; Giner & Arce, 2012; Hansen, 2011; Hill, Shelton, & 
Stevens, 2002; Hope & Gray, 1982; Jorissen, Lybaert, Orens, & Van Der Tas, 2012; Kenny & Larson, 1993; 
Larson, 1997, 2007; Orens, Jorissen, Lybaert, & Van Der Tas, 2011; Puro, 1984; Saemann, 1999; Stenka & 
Taylor, 2010; Sutton, 1984; Watts & Zimmerman, 1978.  
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Relevant to our setting is the survey results in Büthe & Mattli (2011, p. 228) showing that the 
majority of respondents opposed the IASB moving to full fair value accounting yet believed 
this would occur regardless. Ideology theory of regulation helps us frame our study in a way 
that allows us to consider lobbying success in the process with underlying principles, such as 
the standard setter having a preference for fair value accounting that remains unchanged.  
Achieving a broad-based acceptance of its standards by constituents is crucial for the 
survival of the IASB as an internationally recognized standard setter. As a result, the IASB's 
due process includes outlining its proposed changes via Exposure Drafts (EDs) and inviting 
public comment on the particulars of a proposal. However, if constituents are dissatisfied 
with proposals, instead of outright disagreement, lobbyists often use arguments and 
explanations in their responses to try to convince the standard setter to reject its proposals 
(Giner & Arce, 2012). For example, below is the response from the Australian Bankers 
Association (ABA), on whether financial instruments should be irrevocably designated at fair 
value through profit and loss, as part of the IASB's amendments to IAS 32 and IAS 39 in 
2002: 
“The ABA appreciates the flexibility it enables and the reduction in documentation 
for fair value hedges that would eventuate. However, we consider it likely to lead to 
inconsistency in accounting treatments applied between like financial institutions. The 
comparability and usability of financial accounts could be compromised.” (Australian 
Banker’s Association, 2002.) 
It is clear from the example above, that the ABA are not in favor of the proposal of the IASB, 
but instead of outright disagreement, they use a more nuanced argument that does not contain 
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an explicit rejection of the proposal. Rather, the ABA relies on a crafted statement that is 
meant to influence and convince the IASB not to pursue the proposed change.2 
Motivated by the complexity and controversy surrounding private standard setting and the 
form that the comment letters tend to take; our research question asks whether there is room 
to influence the IASB through comment letter submissions during the development of 
standards for financial instruments. We examine whether the use of arguments can be 
captured through negative tone and whether this is a better predictor of lobbying success than 
outright disagreement. 
To do so, we use computerized sentiment analysis to capture dissent in constituents' 
responses to the IASB's proposals. We build on the findings in Giner & Arce (2012) that 
lobbyists use arguments on points of disagreement and develop a dynamic modification to the 
Harvard IV-4 Psychosocial Dictionary’s negative word list to capture negative tone in 
arguments to the IASB. We use logistic regression to estimate the relationship between our 
measures of negativity, explicit opinion, and the IASB's subsequent decision to implement a 
proposed change. Even when controlling for factors that may have an impact on the decision 
of the IASB, such as increased political pressure in the wake of the financial crisis and 
changes relating to more contentious issues, our analysis shows that higher negativity in the 
responses from constituents significantly increases the probability that the IASB will reject 
its proposed course of action.  
We also estimate the marginal effects of negativity and explicit opinion at average and 
theoretically significant values to address concerns that non-linear models are often 
misinterpreted (Ai & Norton, 2003; Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2005; Hoetker, 2007). The 
                                                 
2
 It is worth noting that we selected this example due to its brevity. From our descriptive statistics, the average 
length of a response is 154 words, with the shortest response being 1 word and the longest being 2867 words.  
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results show that regardless of the presence of explicit opinions, the use of negativity remains 
a significant determinant of IASB discarding its proposed standards and amendments.  
As the development of accounting standards is an ongoing process, it is at risk of being 
captured by special interest groups. While the extent to which this happens will vary 
depending on the accounting issue under consideration, we use our negativity measure to 
capture dissent and analyze whether lobbying success, i.e. an increase in the likelihood of the 
IASB rejecting its proposals, is dependent on a special interest group. We find that the 
relation between negative tone and the likelihood of IASB rejecting its proposal is 
significantly lower for comment letters from the financial industry. Further analysis shows 
that this is driven by results in the period after the onset of the global financial crisis. 
Moreover, when classifying dissent more strictly, we find that regulators have more lobbying 
success than other parties. This is potentially due to the cyclical nature of regulation 
(Bertomeu & Magee, 2011) and the EU policy making bodies demanding control over the 
process as a result of the financial crisis (Bengtsson, 2011). 
We contribute to extant literature in the following ways. We show that successful 
lobbyists use negative tone to convey their unhappiness with particular standards and 
amendments, instead of explicitly stating disagreement. Thus, we provide evidence that there 
is room for influence in this latter stage of the standard setting process and that this influence 
can be captured by sentiment analysis. This leads to a methodological contribution as it 
facilitates large-scale analysis of other predictors of influence or potential capture in the 
process. We therefore extend our analysis to examine the difference in influence by interest 
group and contribute to our understanding of the international accounting standard setting 
process. Our results show that for financial instruments the IASB was less responsive to the 
dissent from the financial industry, especially after the onset of the financial crisis, but that 
regulators were more influential. Consistent with Zeff (1978), standard setting by the IASB is 
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therefore not a neutral and technical process, and how capture was exhibited after the 
financial crisis shows that it is very much a political one. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 highlights the institutional 
background of the development of the IASB and its standard setting process. Section 3 
discusses theoretical and empirical contributions of prior literature and develops the 
hypotheses that we test. Sample construction and research design are presented in section 4. 
Section 5 presents our empirical findings and discussion of the main results and section 6 
presents the interest group analysis. Section 7 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Institutional Setting 
The IASB was established in 2001 as a result of the restructuring of the International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). As part of the restructuring, the IASB inherited 
IAS 32 and IAS 39 for accounting for financial instruments, of which IAS 39 is the most 
controversial legacy of the IASC (Camfferman & Zeff, 2007, p.362). This was highlighted by 
then chairman, Sir David Tweedie, when early in his tenure he expressed dissatisfaction with 
this standard in Street (2002), p.86:  
“For example, financial instruments (IAS 39) is the most terrible standard. Any standard 
that requires 200 questions and answers before it has actually come into effect represents 
a major problem.” 
Since this time, the IASB has been committed to improving the standards for financial 
instruments.  
The implementation of IFRS has been both challenging and, at times, controversial. This 
is particularly true in the development and implementation of standards for financial 
instruments. There was widespread opposition to the IASC’s 1997 Financial Instruments 
Discussion Paper (Chatham, Larson, & Vietze, 2010) and prior to the EU adoption of IFRS in 
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2005, the complexity of IAS 39: Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement was 
cited as one of the biggest and most widespread concerns amongst firms about IFRS adoption 
(Jermakowicz & Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006; Larson & Street, 2004). Moreover, the 
responsiveness of the IASB to significant external pressures around these standards was 
brought to the fore in 2008. During the financial crisis, the IASB gave in to demands from 
EU leaders and finance ministers to allow banks to reclassify financial instruments 
retrospectively from the fair value category to the amortized cost category under IAS 39, a 
change that happened outside of the formal due process.  
This in part highlights our motivation for studying the formal lobbying process of the 
IASB as it is not without controversy and is therefore a rich setting to examine the role of 
tone in lobbying. We focus on the room for influence by special-interest lobbying in the 
formal due process. 
 
3. Prior Research and Hypotheses 
3.1 Lobbying and Standard Setting 
It is widely recognized that accounting standard setters have to engage with their constituents 
in the development of a particular piece of regulation. For example, Zeff (1978) attributes the 
demise of the Accounting Principles Board (APB) to its failure to deal with third party 
influence and Zeff (2005) argues that lobbying of accounting standard setters on 
controversial issues is unlikely to diminish. 
The lobbying literature relies on two main theoretical perspectives; Positive Accounting 
Theory (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978) and Sutton's (1984) economic theory of lobbying (e.g., 
Ang et al., 2000; Dechow, Hutton, & Sloan, 1996; Hill et al., 2002; Koh, 2011; Mellado & 
Parte, 2017; Puro, 1984; Schalow, 1995; Zimmerman & Messner, 2015). Whilst focusing on 
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ex ante lobbying decisions by constituents, as opposed to the response by the standard setter, 
these theories assume that the occurrence of lobbying efforts is a result of its efficacy. 
Prior literature that focuses on lobbying success, and undertakes content analysis of 
comment letters, is inconclusive as to the extent standard setters take account of comment 
letters. Some studies show that comment letters have a limited impact and that standards are 
issued without consensus being reached (e.g., Brown, 1981; Mian & Smith, 1990). Other 
studies contest these results and conclude that standard setters' decisions, across a range of 
settings, are affected by comment letter submissions. For example, in the US, Brown & Feroz 
(1992) and Saemann (1999) conclude that comment letters from corporate respondents were 
instrumental in changing the FASB's proposals. Similarly, Hope & Gray (1982) and Jupe 
(2000) find that comment letters from the business community influenced UK standard 
setters. In Australia, Coombes & Stokes (1985) concludes that final standards reflected the 
majority positions expressed in comment letters, and in an international setting the 
predecessor to the IASB, the IASC, was found to change its position in light of constituent 
opposition (Chee Chiu Kwok & Sharp, 2005; Kenny & Larson, 1993).  
In the context of the IASB, Hansen (2011) examines five exposure drafts for different 
accounting standards and finds that the agreement between comment letters and subsequent 
changes depended on the quality of the comment letter, as long as the lobbyist was not a 
business association or consultant. Further, Bamber & McMeeking (2016) examines 
proposals within comment letters responding to the IASB’s 2004 exposure draft on disclosure 
in relation to financial instruments and shows that the IASB’s discussions of comment letters 
is biased against comment letters from the UK and positive towards those from the US. 
Comments from accounting firms were also less influential than average participants with 
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fewer suggestions included into the issued standard IFRS 7.3 Further, in examining lobbying 
around the share-based payments project prior to the issuance of IFRS 2, Giner & Arce 
(2012) studies 539 comment letters sent to the IASB. It finds that only one of three issues 
opposed by the majority of respondents changed from the exposure draft to the final standard, 
namely the reference date. It is therefore ambiguous as to what can be concluded by the 
IASB's standard setting process in light of these results. There seems to be room for 
influence, yet the determinants of success are not fully understood. Next, we look at ideology 
theory of regulation and means of capturing the content of comment letters for meaningful 
analysis of lobbying success. 
3.2 Ideology Theory of Regulation 
The extent to which the IASB's due process provides scope for external influence is 
something of an open question. Büthe & Mattli (2011) argues that once a principle is 
developed, it is near impossible for lobbyists to change it. In addition, Perry & Nölke (2006) 
notes that the development of the fair value paradigm reflects a contemporaneous shift in the 
international political economy stemming from greater growth in profits in the financial 
industry compared to other sectors. Further, the standard setters' own agenda and preferences 
may also shape standard development (Weetman, 2001). Ignoring these factors can cause 
confusion as to the interpretation of lobbying studies, as signs of influence can be wrongly 
interpreted as reaching consensus or, indeed, as the process being captured. In this vein, 
Kothari et al., (2010) argues that there is a lack of a well-developed framework to predict the 
influence of the political process on accounting standards. Using the ideology theory of 
                                                 
3
 These comment letters are included in this analysis as the exposure draft is one out of fourteen considered in 
this study. 
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regulation, they show there is potential for both ideological preferences of regulators and 
special interest lobbying to affect the outcome of standards.4 
Kalt & Zupan (1984) makes a case that a theory of regulation with a broad conception of 
political behavior is required. The argument being that public interest theory is more of a 
normative wish than an effective explanation of regulation, but that capture theory fails to 
recognize the potential importance of ideology. Like public interest theory, ideology theory 
stresses that regulation is a response to market failure, but predicts that lobbying will 
influence regulators, making regulation a joint outcome of political ideology and special 
interest lobbying (Kothari et al., 2010). Applying ideology theory to standard setting, the 
ideology of the standard setter can be viewed as their “ingrained mindset that favors rules 
with certain characteristics” (Gipper, Lombardi, & Skinner, 2013, p. 10). In our setting, the 
ideological component to the development of financial instruments can be argued to be the 
fair value preference that was evident throughout the IASB’s proposals. 
As highlighted above, the move to fair value was controversial amongst preparers of 
pending IFRS adopters (Jermakowicz & Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006). Büthe & Mattli (2011) 
surveyed hundreds of CFOs and senior financial managers and found that over 92 percent of 
respondents believed the IASB would move to full fair value accounting yet over 76 percent 
disagreed that they should (p. 228, figure A.1.1 and p.229 figure A.1.2). This suggests that 
they believed the IASB would not change its position according to its constituents’ 
preferences, and they were right. On 3rd October 2018, Hans Hoogervorst, chairman of the 
IASB, defended the continued emphasis on fair values in IFRS 9 in an article in the Financial 
Times: 
                                                 
4
 For a discussion of how major theories of regulation that have emerged from the literature in political economy 
can be applied to the process of accounting standard setting, see Kothari et al. (2010). 
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“Fears that fair value accounting lead to improper early profit recognition are also 
overblown. IFRS 9 prohibits companies from doing that when quoted prices in active 
markets are not available and the quality of earnings is highly uncertain. Moreover, fair 
value accounting is often quicker at identifying losses than cost accounting. That is why 
banks lobbied so actively against it during the crisis.” (Financial Times, 2018)5 
It is clear that this ideological component was established early on, yet the radical move to 
allow reclassification of financial instruments to the amortized cost category during the 
financial crisis was achieved outside the formal due process of the IASB. Even so, comment 
letter submissions have been plentiful throughout the development of financial instruments 
accounting during the first ten years of the existence of the IASB. It remains an open question 
therefore as to whether there is room for influence through the formal channels in the 
development of these standards and we state our first hypothesis in the null below.  
Hypothesis 1. The IASB does not take account of dissenting opinions from special 
interest groups. 
3.3 Psychological Reactance and Comment Letter Tone 
Exposure drafts pose clear questions regarding the proposed changes to standards. Most 
often, the questions are phrased “Do you agree?” or “Is this appropriate?” and, hence, give 
the lobbyist the opportunity to express their explicit agreement or disagreement. However, 
prior research has discovered that comment letters are often ambiguous in nature (e.g., 
Francis, 1987; Hansen, 2011; Holthausen & Leftwich, 1983). As noted in Sutton (1984), it is 
unlikely that lobbyists would voluntarily incur the cost of submitting comment letters unless 
they expect to gain some benefit. Therefore, the text contained in responses that do not 
explicitly state an opinion must still be intended to influence the outcome.  
                                                 
5
Hoogervorst, H. 2018. “Do not blame accounting rules for the financial crisis Current standards are designed to 
reflect economic reality as closely as possible” [Financial Times October 3 2018] 
https://www.ft.com/content/bd084b5c-c623-11e8-86b4-bfd556565bb2 
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Whilst most academic research has largely focused on the characteristics of the lobbyists, 
some research, such as Kwok & Sharp (2005), Hansen (2011) and Jupe (2000), pays closer 
attention to the effect of text or letter characteristics in their analyses. Jupe (2000) shows that 
the UK Accounting Standards Board (ASB) changed its proposals on FRS 1 according to the 
wishes expressed in comment letters from large companies that used self-referential 
arguments in their discussion of the proposal. Kwok & Sharp (2005) focuses on keywords 
within comment letters that referred to different facets of power and Hansen (2011) shows 
that lobbying success related to the quality of information in the response, as well as 
lobbyists' credibility and their potential to affect the viability of the IASB.6 Taken together, 
these results highlight the importance for lobbyists to frame their position in a suitable way to 
be influential.  
The linguistics and communication literature provide some explanation to appropriate 
forms of persuasion. The theory of psychological reactance predicts that people are likely to 
resist persuasion as it involves a threat to their autonomy and ability to believe or act in a 
particular way. Studies in this field show that there is a relation between forceful language 
and reactance (Quick & Considine, 2008). A familiar application of this theory is reverse 
psychology, where the one subjected to persuasion is expected to resist the threat to their 
autonomy by acting in the opposite way to what is being suggested. Therefore, to achieve the 
desired change in opinion or behavior, one would pretend to try to induce the opposite 
reaction.  
In examining comment letters, we observe that aversion to a proposal is often presented 
to suggest agreement. The example below demonstrates this approach and is a response to the 
IASB's July 2009 exposure draft that proposed “to prohibit reclassification of financial assets 
                                                 
6
 The proxy for comment letter quality, used in Hansen (2011) was derived from principal component factor 
analysis of the percentage of questions answered, the number of pages of the letter, the number of references to 
the IASB's constitution, framework, or other IAS/IFRS, and number of references to accounting standards or 
frameworks from national s tandard setters. 
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and financial liabilities between the amortised cost and fair value categories.”7 The invitation 
to comment section included the question:   
“Do you agree that reclassification should be prohibited? If not, in what 
circumstances do you believe reclassification is appropriate and why do such 
reclassifications provide understandable and useful information to users of financial 
statements? How would you account for such reclassifications, and why?” 
The Corporate Accounting Committee (CAC) of the Securities Analysts Association of Japan 
(SAAJ) responded: 
“The CAC basically supports the proposal in the exposure draft to prohibit 
reclassification. However, business models sometimes change fundamentally, for 
example, management changes associated with M&A. Under these circumstances, 
reclassification should be exceptionally permitted subject to (1) detailed disclosure of 
reasons for reclassification and its influence, and (2) no retrospective application.” 
(SAAJ, 2009)  
Consistent with the theory of psychological reactance, the findings in (Kwok & Sharp, 
2005) shows the IASC ultimately disregarded arguments based on threats. As a result, 
avoiding outright disagreement in a response may reduce or eliminate reactance on the part of 
the IASB and allow for a more persuasive argument.8  
In sections 3.1 and 3.2, we discussed whether constituents are likely to be influential 
through comment letter submissions in the formal due process. We conclude that this 
warrants analysis and that the influence we might observe has not changed IASB’s 
ideological conviction that fair values are the most suitable for financial instruments. Looking 
at textual tone, in addition to explicitly stated opinions in comment letters, can identify more 
                                                 
7
 The question is taken from the invitation to comment section of IASB's exposure draft: “Financial Instruments: 
Classification and Measurement” which was issued in July 2009 
8
 For the reclassification issue in the example above, the IASB subsequently decided to allow reclassification in 
the event of a change of business model. 
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subtle ways of expressing dissent and whether this is influential. Stated formally, in the null, 
our second hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2. Lobbying success is unaffected by negative tone in comment letters.  
 
4. Research Design and Sample 
Manual content analysis can introduce subjectivity into text analysis (Krippendorff, 2004). In 
addition, it is a costly process where large sample analysis is required and makes replication 
unlikely. As a result, computerized content analysis, which is objective and replicable, has 
been increasingly used since 2000 (Fisher, Garnsey, Goel, & Tam, 2010). Recent literature in 
both accounting and finance is employing these methods to quantify the vast amount of 
information contained within financial texts which can have an impact on decision-making. 
The methods and linguistic features under consideration vary and include measures of 
readability (Li, 2008; Loughran & McDonald, 2014), machine learning (Antweiler et al., 
2004; Li, 2010) and the use of word lists (Loughran & McDonald, 2011; Rogers, Van 
Buskirk, & Zechman, 2011; Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, & Macskassy, 2008).  
4.1 Sample Selection 
Our sample is derived from the comment letters that the IASB makes available on its website, 
www.ifrs.org, as part of its commitment to a transparent standard setting process. We focus 
on the four standards that deal explicitly with accounting for financial instruments: IAS 32 
Financial Instruments: Presentation, IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement and their superseding replacements IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures 
and IFRS 9 Financial Instruments. At the time of the data collection, 3064 comment letters 
had been generated in response to 24 documents, issued by the IASB, relating to the 
development of these standards since 2001. Of these 3064, 1815 comment letters responded 
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to the 16 exposure drafts that related to completed projects, i.e. for which there is an 
identifiable outcome. 
There can be ambiguity when identifying the outcomes of proposed changes, as parts of a 
proposal may be adopted while other parts are not (Francis, 1987; Holthausen & Leftwich, 
1983). Following Hansen (2011), we aim to reduce this ambiguity by analyzing responses to 
the invitation to comment section of the exposure drafts. This section of the exposure drafts 
contains questions regarding the specifics of proposed changes on which the IASB invites 
constituents to comment.  
To remove ambiguity further, several specific exposure drafts, and the comment letters on 
these drafts, were excluded. For “Derecognition: Proposed Amendments to IAS 39 and IFRS 
7”, as issued in April 2009, the whole proposal was withdrawn. This also occurred for 
“Offsetting Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities”, as issued in January 2011. As such, 
the observations cannot be reliably compared to the outcome of separate issues within the 
exposure draft, leaving 1695 comment letters for analysis.  
As the study focuses on lobbyists' ability to prevent proposals from becoming standards, 
only the 70 questions that refer to proposed amendments to which lobbyists have an 
opportunity to communicate their opposition or concerns are included in the analysis. These 
questions take the form “Do you agree?” or “Is this appropriate?” for example, and relate to 
the proposed amendment, not an alternative. The majority of the questions (86 out of 107) 
takes this form. Table 1, panel A outlines the distribution of the sample across comment 
periods. The sample contains 5078 question-observations and are well dispersed between the 
periods before and after the commencement of the financial crisis as 47% relate to the pre-
crisis period and 53% to the post-crisis period. Table 1, Panel B outlines the interest group 
distribution of the comment letter authors. In terms of lobbyist characteristics, the biggest 
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lobby group is the financial sector, excluding accountants, and comprises 34.27% of our 
sample.  
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
4.2 Outcome - the IASB's Decision 
The proposed amendments referred to in each question are compared to the subsequently 
issued amendments to the standards. If the proposal to which the question relates is not 
incorporated in the subsequent amendment, i.e. there has been a change from the proposal to 
the finalized standard; a binary variable, REJECT is coded 1 and otherwise 0. Four 
researchers, including three senior chartered accountants, independently classified the 
outcome. The classifications were compared, and in instances of disagreement; 14 out of 70 
questions, the outcomes were discussed until consensus was reached. A change was 
identified for 28 questions (40%), which is similar to Hansen (2011) that identified a change 
for 46% of the issues in a multi-issue setting.  
4.3 Explicit Opinions 
To capture unambiguously stated opinions in the responses, if available, two indicator 
variables, AGREE and DISAGREE, are defined and obtained as follows. As the questions 
included in the analysis take the form: “Do you agree?” or “Is this appropriate?”, the first 
word in the answer being “yes” is identified as agreement and “no” as disagreement. Further, 
unless negated, occurrences of “agree” anywhere within the answer, are identified as 
agreement and, if negated, as disagreement. Occurrences of “disagree” or “oppos” (the stem 
is used to allow for different grammatical variations, e.g. oppose, opposition etc.) are, unless 
negated, taken to indicate disagreement. If the response contains any form of explicit 
agreement, as defined above, an indicator variable, AGREE, takes the value 1, otherwise 0. 
DISAGREE takes the value 1 for any occurrences of explicit disagreement and otherwise 0.  
 17 
4.4 Negativity: A Continuous Measure of Opposition 
To construct our continuous measure of tone, we use computerized content analysis relying 
on pre-defined word lists that categorize words according to their generally accepted 
meaning/sentiment. Due to the political nature of the communication, the level of positivity 
may be misleading as a measure of consent. In addition, discontent may be wrapped in 
positivity by negating the positive words. Tetlock (2007) and Loughran & McDonald (2011 
&  2013) note that positive word lists are of limited use for this reason. Measuring negativity 
circumvents the noise from using positive word lists and allows the analysis to capture even 
that part of the sample that avoids explicit opposition yet makes its discontent with the 
proposal known to the standard setter.  
The negative word list is taken from the Harvard IV-4 Psychosocial Dictionary (Harvard 
IV).9  Harvard IV contains words that are considered negative in a general sense and 
misclassifies some words in our context. Examples are words such as “liability”, “loss” and 
“impairment”, all classified as negative, yet in this context, merely refer to the topic of the 
exposure drafts. Classifying these words as negative, as per the word lists, would overstate 
the negative tone in the analysis.  
To reduce the noise in the measurement, the primary negativity measure is obtained by 
programmatic modification of the classifications to better suit the text to which it is applied. 
Words that occur frequently in an exposure draft are, when used in a corresponding comment 
letter, likely to be a reference to its occurrence in the exposure draft. To edit the classification 
scheme accordingly, if a word is classified as negative in Harvard IV, but occurs with a 
                                                 
9
 The version used in the analysis comes from Bill McDonald's word list page where the Harvard IV has been 
extended to include relevant inflections. The list is available at: 
http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/Data/Harvard%20IV_Negative%20Word%20List_Inf.txt  
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frequency of more than 0.5% of the words in the exposure draft, it is removed from the 
negativity count in comment letters, so as not to unduly increase the negativity score.10 
Whilst there are still occasions of misclassification, the programmatic modification 
appears to improve the classification scheme. For instance, the word “cost” is excluded from 
the negative word count in comment letters corresponding to five exposure drafts. In all 
known examples, it refers to “amortized cost”, i.e. the topic of proposed changes and carries 
no negative sentiment. An example is EFRAG's response to the 2004 Exposure Draft of 
Proposed Amendments to IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement: The 
Fair Value Option: 
“EFRAG supports the pragmatic approach as regards the transitional requirements 
i.e. no retrospective application when an entity changes the measurement from at fair 
value through profit and loss to amortised cost.” [Emphasis added] 
Conversely, in the letter from the Australian “Group of 100”, in response to the 2003 
Exposure Draft of Proposed Amendments to IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement: Fair Value Hedge Accounting for a Portfolio Hedge of Interest Rate Risk , the 
word “cost” is included in the negative word count. In this case, it carries a negative 
sentiment, as increased costs are portrayed as an unfavorable economic consequence of the 
proposed change: 
“Core deposits are a significant fixture of the Australian banking system. The 
inability to apply fair value hedging in respect of core deposits is likely to result in the 
use of cash flow hedging for core deposits. This will lead to the duplication of systems 
where these entities use portfolio hedging in respect of other activities, increases in 
                                                 
10
 Whilst this cut-off point seems arbitrary, we check what words it alters and set it at a level that seems to re-
classify the words that would otherwise unduly carry negative sentiment. Whilst the test for our reported result 
use this modified word-list that appear better suited to the context, we repeat all tests using the Harvard IV and 
Fin-Neg (Loughran and McDonald (20110 without modification and our results are qualitatively the same.  
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transaction costs and potentially to changes in product design and pricing and 
funding arrangements.” [Emphasis added] 
“Risk” is the most frequently blocked word and is removed from the negativity count in 
comment letters corresponding to any of the 12 exposure drafts in which this word occurred 
with a frequency of more than 0.5%. In total, it is removed 1181 times. The words “loss” and 
“board” are removed from the negativity count every time they appear in a comment letter as 
they are frequent in all exposure drafts. In total, 63 unique words are removed from the 
negativity count. In addition, any negative words that occur in a question are blocked from 
the negativity count in the corresponding answers. This process reclassifies a further 401 
words from negative to neutral of which the word “question” is reclassified as neutral 120 
times.  
We follow Loughran & McDonald (2011) by adding negated positive words to the 
negative word count if “no”, “not”, “none”, “neither”, “never”, “nobody” occurs within 
three words preceding the positive word.11 Contrary to Loughran & McDonald (2011) that 
does not take account of negations preceding negative words as they do not expect phrases 
such as “not terrible earnings” in financial reports, our sample of comment letters contains 
phrases such as “We have no objections to the proposal” and, therefore, negated negative 
words are accounted for by excluding the word from the negative word count.  
As per Fagan & Gençay (2011), so-called stop words are removed from the analysis as 
they can distort the overall negativity score.12 Finally, the term weighting scheme in equation 
1, suitable to samples comprising documents of different length, is applied to the negativity 
                                                 
11
 The positive words come from the Harvard IV-4 Psychosocial dictionary available at 
http://www.webuse.umd.edu:9090/tags/ 
12
 The list of generic stop words has been downloaded from https://sraf.nd.edu/textual-




assessment as it is recognized that terms carry different levels of sentiment depending on 
their frequency (Loughran & McDonald, 2011).  






,        𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑓𝑖,𝑗 ≥ 1
 0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
        (1) 
 
The weighted value, w, for each word, i, in each letter, j, is determined by the frequency, 
tf, of the term within the letter divided by the total number of words in the letter, a. This is 
further adjusted by the total number of letters in the sample, N, divided by the document 
frequency, i.e. the number of letters in which the word occurred, df. The resulting measure 
generates a continuous negativity score, NEGATIVITY, between 0 and 1, with 1 being the 
most negative and 0 the least negative. 
If lobbyists can prevent proposals from making it into accounting standards, it is expected 
that mean levels of negativity and disagreement will be higher for those proposals that were 
not adopted, i.e. rejected proposals, relative proposals that were implemented. 
4.5 Model specification 
To identify whether there is the potential for lobbying to influence the standard setter's 
decision as whether to implement proposed changes, we use a logistic regression model with 
a dependent variable, REJECT, equal to 1 for rejected proposed changes and 0 for 
implemented proposed changes. The regression models the dependent variable as a function 
of negativity, NEGATIVITY, and two indicator variables for explicit opinion, AGREE and 
DISAGREE, as well as the control variables defined below. The model therefore assesses 
whether there is an association between the likelihood of a proposal being rejected and the 
explanatory variables. To test whether the effect of negativity is conditional on explicit 






= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐼𝑇𝑌 +
𝛽4𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡             (2) 
Controls for political pressure 
The model Equation 2 includes four control variables that potentially have an independent 
effect on any decision made by the IASB. Macroeconomic factors are known to affect the 
political pressure on regulators (Bertomeu & Magee, 2011). Therefore, an indicator variable, 
POST, takes the value 1 for the exposure draft being issued after the commencement of the 
financial crisis, as defined by the bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 
2008, and 0 otherwise. This variable controls for the increased political pressure on the IASB 
that followed the allegations of its standards’ role in the financial crisis (Bengtsson, 2011). 
Much of the criticism of the IASB post-2008 relates closely to financial instruments and as 
such, the decision to reject certain proposals may be a result of political pressure that falls 
outside of the comment letter lobbying.  
Further, it is possible that the salience of the topic under consideration, and the volume of 
comment letters received, makes the organization more hesitant to go ahead with 
implementing proposed changes. For example, Bertomeu & Magee (2015) shows that 
increases in required disclosure proceed more slowly when increased disclosure costs imply 
greater political resistance from reporting firms. Therefore, the log of the volume of comment 
letters corresponding to the exposure draft, VOLLG, is included in the model. In addition, the 
length of the responses may signal that the proposed change is particularly complicated or 
controversial, which may lead the IASB to reject the proposed change or defer its 
implementation. Consequently, LENGTH, the number of lines in the answer to the question 
and WORDS, the number of words in the letter, are also included as control variables. These 
variables have also been used to proxy for the quality of the response (See, Hansen, 2011). A 
binary variable ISS takes 1 if the accounting issue in question is relating to classification and 
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measurement, as these may be perceived as particularly salient and controversial 
(Jermakowicz & Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006), and 0 otherwise.  
Dissenting opinions 
To test our hypotheses further and to assess the differences in lobbying success amongst 
lobbyists we parse our sample on AGREE to exclude those observations that express explicit 
agreement and retain a subsample of dissenting observations. The underpinnings for this 
partition is that lobbying is costly and will only take place if the potential benefits outweigh 
the cost, with the benefits being conditional on the probability of being influential (Sutton, 
1984). As such, lobbyists’ responses that do not contain agreement are likely trying to 
convince the standard setter to alter its proposals. Prior research finds that a common strategy 
is to use arguments only on points of disagreement (Giner & Arce, 2012). We use this 
subsample to examine the effect of negativity and explicit disagreement and control for 
previously documented factors of lobbying success. We also create a more restrictive 
subsample where we require AGREE to be 0 and for NEGATIVITY to be above its median of 
.0668 to be classified as dissenting. This sample allows for a cleaner test of lobbying success. 
We initially use the sample to test whether our reliance on negative tone captures dissent in 
an appropriate way by examining the explanatory power of documented factors from prior 
research. We then use this sample to test whether specific interest groups are more/less 
influential in the process. 
Additional predictors of lobbying success 
In the dissenting subsamples, we also control for a host of variables representing the ability to 
provide information to the IASB, the credibility of the lobbyist, and their impact on the 
viability of the IASB, all which are important for lobbying success (Hansen, 2011). 
Specifically, to control for the quality of the response, we include PERCQ which is the 
percentage of questions posed in the exposure draft that were answered in the letter, CONCL, 
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an indicator variable that takes 1 if the letter mentions the IASB’s conceptual framework and 
0 otherwise. CONT, that takes the value 1 if the lobbyist is a named financial supporter in the 
IASCF/IFRS Foundation’s annual report in the year of the comment period and 0 otherwise. 
MARK is the market capitalization of listed companies in the country as a percentage of 
market capitalization of listed companies in the world, in the year of the observation. 
BOARDC, takes the value 1 if there is at least one member on the IASB from the 
constituent’s home country during the consultation period for the relevant comment letter, 
and 0 otherwise.  
In addition, a key feature in reporting systems that target equity investors, as opposed to 
banks and other creditors, is more extensive disclosure requirements (La Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes, & Shleifer, 2006; Nobes, 1998). We therefore group the comment letter authors’ 
home country into high equity importance and low equity importance. We construct the 
measure in a similar way to Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki (2003) and use the mean rank of two 
variables used in La-Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny (1997). The first variable is 
constructed as a ratio of the aggregate stock market capitalization to gross national product 
for the entire time period 2002-2011, scaled by a measure of ownership concentration in the 
country, developed by (La-Porta et al., 1997). The second variable is the number of listed 
domestic firms per capita. The mean rank is constructed so that higher scores indicate greater 
importance of equity. EI_RANK_I takes the value 1 if the rank is above the median and 0 
otherwise. There is missing data on ownership concentration for eleven countries: Czech 
Republic, China, Mauritius, Tanzania, Luxembourg, Romania, Cyprus, UAE, Russia, Poland, 
and Rwanda. This corresponds to 160 observations, i.e. 3.1% of the observations. These 
countries are likely to place lower importance on equity, and, as a result, to the extent that 
deleting these observations creates bias in the results, we believe this would likely understate 
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the differences in the importance of equity amongst the lobbyists and reduce the magnitude 
and significance of the results.  
We include two controls for the accounting tradition in the lobbyist’s home country. First, 
ANGLO takes 1 if the accounting system in the lobbyists’ home country is rooted in Anglo-
Saxon traditions. Accounting traditions of the IASB's constituents vary primarily because of 
the differences in sources of external finance available to firms in different countries (Nobes, 
1998). Mandated standards prior to the introduction of IFRS, as well as the reporting 
incentives of managers therefore vary across markets (Ball, Kothari, & Robin, 2000; 
Burgstahler, Hail, & Leuz, 2006; Leuz et al., 2003). IFRS are arguably grounded in the 
Anglo-Saxon accounting tradition with shareholders as the prime user of financial reports.13 
Botzem & Quack (2009) point out that Anglo-American logic amongst private standard 
setters shows their preference for capital-market oriented standards that above all serve the 
needs of large multinational corporations. Further, respondents from US companies, as 
compared to German, French and UK companies, in Büthe & Mattli (2011) report that they 
are more confident that their efforts will be influential in the IASB standard setting process. 
Therefore, it is possible that lobbyists from countries with an accounting ideology and/or 
domestic institutions, more closely related to that of the IASB will be more engaged in the 
process and be more successful in their lobbying efforts.  
Last, we control for the extent of differences between IFRS and local accounting 
standards prior to IFRS adoption. We base our measure on the scores of absence and 
divergence developed in Ding, Hope, Jeanjean, & Stolowy (2007). Absence is defined as “the 
extent to which the rules regarding certain accounting issues are missing and Divergence as 
the extent to which the rules regarding the same accounting issue differ” (Ding et al., 2007, 
                                                 
13
 The existence of Anglo-Saxon accounting has been debated in the literature with some claiming that it is a 
tenuous concept (Alexander & Archer, 2000) and others arguing that there is strong support for the existence 
and importance of the concept for international accounting (Nobes, 2003). 
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p.3). We therefore take the average of the absence and divergence score and IAS_DIFF takes 
1 if the average is above the median, and 0 otherwise. 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents univariate comparisons of observations relating to proposals that were 
rejected and implemented. The last column reports the p-values of the test of differences 
based on t-test for the means and Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the medians. Explicit agreement 
is more common for proposals that were implemented, whilst explicit disagreement is more 
common in responses to proposals that were not subsequently implemented. Similarly, the 
mean level of negativity is higher for proposals that were not implemented. Whilst 
exploratory in nature, these initial findings suggest that the IASB takes account of the 
comment letter lobbying. 
 [TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
For POSTC, the mean is significantly higher for observations relating to proposed 
changes that were not implemented than for those that were. The IASB abandoned more 
proposed changes after the start of the financial crisis, perhaps as a result of the increased 
criticism of IFRS, particularly in relation to accounting for financial instruments, which 
occurred around the financial crisis (Bengtsson, 2011). Similarly, the mean for VOLLG is 
significantly greater when proposed changes were not implemented, which suggests that the 
IASB is more hesitant to implement its proposals when political pressure, or interest, is 
greater. However, VOLLG and POSTC are highly correlated, suggesting that they may both 
be capturing the post-crisis criticism or increased interest in the standard setting process of 
the IASB after the financial crisis.  
Amongst the explanatory variables, NEGATIVITY and DISAGREE are positively 
correlated, whilst both are negatively correlated with explicit agreement. This confirms that 
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lobbyists who disagree tend to use more negative language than lobbyists who agree and 
provides some validation that our negativity scores capture discontent with proposed 
changes. To the extent that multicollinearity may cause bias in our results, the precision of 
the estimates may be lower and their standard error greater leading us to fail to reject the null 
that our opinion variables have no impact on the IASB’s decision to reject its proposals. We 
include each variable of interest separately, interacted, and with and without the inclusion of 
controls in our main tests to address this.14 
5.2 Multivariate Analysis 
The coefficients measure the impact of the variables on the natural logarithm of the relative 
probability of blocking a proposal, compared with it being implemented. The multivariate 
estimates for the logistic regression are presented in Table 3. Given the logit transformation 
of the outcome dependent variable, it can be misleading to interpret the parameter estimates 
(Jones & Hensher, 2004). Moreover, as we include interactions terms to test whether 
negativity has a different explanatory power when combined with explicit opinions, we are 
conscious that the sign and significance of the marginal effects cannot be deduced by the 
coefficients alone (Ai & Norton, 2003; Brambor et al., 2005; Hoetker, 2007). Therefore, 
following (Brambor et al., 2005) a second stage analysis is added to graphically show the 
marginal impact of the constitutive parts of the interaction variables at meaningful values of 
the covariates. The results are presented in Figure 1.  
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
As Table 3 shows, the coefficient for negativity, NEGATIVITY, is positive and 
significant. The positive and significant coefficient and marginal effect is consistent with a 
proposal being met with higher aggregate levels of negativity being more likely to be 
                                                 
14
 In untabulated descriptive statistics, there is a significant positive correlation between LENGTH (number of 
lines in the observation) and NEGATIVITY and DISAGREE. This is consistent with the findings of Giner & 
Arce (2012) that more arguments are used to substantiate points of disagreement than agreement. Similarly, we 
also observe that agreeing comments often simply state: “Yes” or “We agree.” 
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rejected.15 Figure 1, Panel A shows the predicted probabilities of a proposed change being 
rejected at various levels of negativity, holding all other variables constant at their means. In 
the left diagram, NEGATIVITY is considered over its full range 0-1. In the right diagram, we 
consider values from 0-0.3 where 99% of all observations fall. Both diagrams show an 
increase in the prediction with higher levels of negativity. The 95% confidence interval bars 
show that higher values of negativity are significantly greater than lower values. Figure 1, 
Panel A shows that when negativity increases from its mean value of 0.04 by a standard 
deviation of 0.06, the prediction of IASB’s likelihood of rejecting its proposal increases from 
just over 40% to just under 45%.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 1, Panel B shows the predictions over the same values of negativity in the absence 
or presence of disagreement (right) and agreement (left). The predictions in the presence of 
disagreement (DISAGREE=1) are not significantly different from the absence of 
disagreement (DISAGREE=0). Conversely, agreement is significantly different and its 
presence (AGREE=1) leads to a prediction roughly 10 percentage points lower than in the 
absence of agreement (AGREE=0) for values of NEGATIVITY below 0.2. This is significant 
at the 5% level. At higher levels of NEGATIVITY, the effect of AGREE becomes less precise. 
As hypothesized by Grossman & Helpman (2001), lobbyists must transmit their view in a 
way that aligns with the ideology of the regulator that they are trying to influence. As the 
exposure drafts are produced according to the conceptual framework and ideology of the 
IASB, explicit disagreement may be seen as a signal of incongruence between the views of 
                                                 
15
 For robustness, we repeat our main analysis using four measures of negativity used in prior research. 
Specifically, we test HARVARD_NEG, the ratio of negative words to total words based on the Harvard IV-4 
Psychosocial Dictionary, HARVARD_NEG_W, applying the weighting scheme in Equation 1 to the 
HARVARD_NEG measure, FIN_NEG, the ratio of negative words to total words based on the financial word list 
developed in Loughran & McDonald (2011), and FIN_NEG_W with the weighting scheme applied to the 
FIN_NEG measure. Results are qualitatively similar, but the level of negativity is higher without the context -
specific adjustment described in section 4.4. 
 28 
the lobbyist and the IASB. Whilst, explicit disagreement is not significant in explaining the 
IASB’s decision, we find that negativity does and, as such, we reject the null of hypothesis 1 
and conclude that the IASB takes account of dissenting opinions in comment letters. This is 
consistent with ideology theory as it shows that there is room for influence but that this 
depends on seeming agreement or persuasion. 
Dissenting subsamples 
In our dissenting subsample, i.e. where AGREE=0, we investigate whether negativity or 
disagreement is more effective in convincing the IASB to reject its proposed changes in 
observations absent of agreement. Table 4 presents the results of the logistic regressions. The 
coefficient for disagreement (DISAGREE) is not significant in any model, regardless of the 
inclusion of negativity or control variables. Neither does it have a significant marginal effect 
on the propensity of the IASB to reject the proposed change when other values are held 
constant at their means. Conversely, the coefficient and marginal effect of NEGATIVITY are 
positive and significant in all models.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
The predictive margins in Figure 2 provides a fuller picture of its impact. The picture is 
consistent with the full sample analysis, with higher levels of negativity leading to a 
significantly higher likelihood of the proposed change being rejected. The diagram on the 
right shows that the predictions in the presence and absence of disagreement are not 
significantly different. We therefore reject the null hypothesis 2 and conclude that the tone in 
comment letters affects lobbying success. This result is in line with the explanation offered 
by psychological reactance and with previous findings that lobbyists present a supporting 
argument when disagreeing with the standard setter (Giner & Arce, 2012). Our measure of 
negativity within these arguments successfully captures the effect on the IASB of these 
arguments, unlike outright disagreement. 
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[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Next, we use the more strictly classified sample of dissent where we require that 
observations do not include explicit agreement and that NEGATIVITY  is above the median, 
0.0688. Jorissen et al. (2012) finds that preparers, accountants, and standard setters lobby 
more about measurement issues, while users, stock exchanges, and regulators lobby more 
regarding disclosure issues. If motivations to lobby vary with the type of accounting issue in 
question, it is possible that lobbying success does too. Therefore, in addition to looking at all 
accounting issues under consideration, we split the sample according to whether the issue 
covers classification and measurement or mainly disclosure and test whether prior 
documented predictors of lobbying success hold in our sample. We find that the number of 
lines in the response to a particular question, LENGTH, which can be viewed as representing 
disagreement, as points of disagreement tend to be backed up with arguments (Giner & Arce, 
2012), quality of the response (Hansen, 2011) or simply the complexity of the issue, has 
opposite directions for classification and measurement issues to other issues. Whilst, we 
consider this an important control, it is unclear how to interpret it. For disclosure and other 
issues, we find that lobbying success is significantly (at the 10% level) related to the 
importance of equity in the lobbyist’s home country. The marginal effect of EI_RANK_I is 
0.125 (z-score = 1.74), suggesting that dissenting lobbyists from countries with high equity 
importance are on average 12.5 percentage points more successful in convincing the IASB to 
abandon its proposed changes than lobbyist’s from countries with low equity importance. 
Disclosures are particularly important in countries where equity is more important (La Porta 
et al., 2006; Nobes, 1998) and so lobbyists from these countries may be particularly engaged 
in the process and provide more convincing arguments.  
Classification and measurement issues reveal other strong associations between lobbying 
success and lobbyist characteristics. Like Hansen (2011), we find that comment letter quality, 
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as measured by the questions answered in the comment letter as a percentage of the total 
number of questions posed in the exposure draft, QPERC, a serving board member from the 
lobbyist’s country, BOARDC, and whether the lobbyist is a known financial contributor to the 
IASB, CONT, are all positively and significantly related to lobbying success. Further, we find 
that ANGLO, i.e. whether the lobbyist’s home country has a tradition of Anglo-Saxon 
accounting, is negatively and significantly linked to lobbying success. Bamber & McMeeking 
(2016) finds the IASB tends to react less favorably to UK respondents. To test whether this is 
the effect we observe, we replace ANGLO with a dummy variable for the lobbyist being from 
the UK and find a marginal effect of -0.24 (z – 1.89) showing that UK lobbyists are less 
likely to succeed in influencing the IASB, in line with the findings of Bamber & McMeeking 
(2016). We do not find significant effects for ANGLO when we include additional indicators 
for the UK and/or and for the US. 16 We conclude that many of the factors that have been 
found to determine lobbying success in the IASB’s process in prior literature are also present 
in our analysis when using negative tone to capture dissent. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
6. Interest group analysis 
We use our measure of negativity to examine the process further. As the computerized 
measure allows us to examine a large-scale sample, we look at the impact of various interest 





= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐼𝑇𝑌 + 𝛽2𝐼𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝐺𝑥𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
 
                                                 
16
We include US as it has been argued to have a special role in international standard setting :  “The United 
States is at once one of the IASB’s  most powerful constituents and most reluctant endorsers, a contradiction that 
reflects its unique role in IFRS international politics” (Ramanna, 2013; p. 6) 
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IG is a dummy variable which changes between the six interest groups defined above, i.e. 
business community (BUS), financial industry (FIN), academics (ACA), professional 
accountants/auditors (ACC), regulators (REG) and national standard setters (STN). Table 6, 
panel A presents the results. Controls are included but not reported. As before, the coefficient 
for NEGATIVITY is positive and significant in all instances. However, the coefficient for the 
interaction between NEGATIVITY and the interest group (NEGATIVITYxIG) is negative and 
significant at 10% when IG takes 1 if the lobbyist is from the financial industry. This is 
consistent with the negative tone of this group being less influential in convincing the IASB 
to reject its proposed changes.  
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
To investigate further, we explore the impact of the interest group in the more strictly 
classified sample of dissenting observations, i.e. where AGREE=0 and NEGATIVITY is above 
the median. Table 6, panel B presents the results. The coefficient for IG is negative and 
significant when it represents the financial industry and the marginal effect shows that the 
IASB is ten percentage points less likely to reject its proposals when dissenting responses are 
submitted by the financial industry. We also find results consistent with regulators being 
particularly successful in their efforts to overturn IASB’s proposed changes. Bertomeu & 
Magee (2011) argues that political power in accounting regulation shifts with macro-
economic conditions and Bengtsson (2011) shows that the IASB was endorsed by the EU as a 
private standard setter but that the financial crisis brought about a change in the attention and 
political involvement of EU regulatory bodies. In unreported results, we find that dissenting 
regulators have been more influential than other groups both before and after the financial 
crisis. However, our results for lower influence of the financial industry is driven by the 
period after the financial crisis. This result is partially consistent with Bengtson’s (2011) 
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analysis showing a rebalancing of power from private to public bodies in the wake of the 
financial crisis.  
7. Conclusion 
This paper investigates whether the IASB takes account of formal lobbying in its 
development of standards for financial instruments. Our work is grounded in ideology theory 
for our hypotheses and tests and as such, we recognise that influence at this stage is not 
necessarily evidence of capture, as the main paradigm guiding the ideology of the standard 
setter may prevail even if lobbyists are successful. Consistent with ideology theory of 
regulation, our main tests show that there is influence afforded to lobbyists at the comment 
letter stage of the process, supporting that special interest lobbying does play a part in the 
formation of accounting regulation.  
To overcome the methodological challenges stemming from the ambiguous nature of 
comment letters, and to avoid the potential for subjectivity that may result from manual 
content analysis, we use computerized sentiment analysis to undertake a large-scale empirical 
investigation of constituents’ responses to issue-specific questions within exposure drafts 
issued by the IASB. We build on the work by Giner & Arce (2012) that finds that lobbyists 
use lengthy arguments on points of disagreement. The theory of psychological reactance 
predicts that persuasion is resisted and, when applied to our setting, a standard setter may 
have a stronger reaction when faced with explicit disagreement. Lobbyists seem aware of 
this, as evident by their low use of forceful language (Kwok & Sharp, 2005) and explicit 
disagreement. We therefore capture dissent by estimating a continuous negativity score for all 
comment letters submitted to the IASB. We show that, consistent with ideology theory and 
psychological reactance, lobbying success on points of disagreement, is explained by tone in 
the letter, not explicit disagreement. These findings are robust across several specifications of 
negativity. 
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We next use our measure of dissent to examine predictors of previously documented 
factors of lobbying success and lobbying from specific interest groups. Our results show that 
the effect of negativity from regulators has a greater impact on the decisions of the IASB than 
other interest groups, and negativity has a significantly lower impact when it comes from the 
financial industry. We attribute this finding to the shift in power and influence in accounting 
standard setting as a result of the financial crisis (Bengtsson, 2011).  
Finally, while we have examined lobbying on accounting for financial instruments, our 
approach and methodology is flexible and presents a robust and useful framework for 
examining lobbying on other standards, and future research that does so will allow for a 
richer and more nuanced picture of the IASB’s standard setting process.
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
 AGREE 1 if there is an occurrence of explicit agreement, 0 otherwise 
ANGLO 1 if the lobbyist is from a country with Anglo-Saxon accounting tradition, 
0 otherwise 
BOARD_C 1 if there was a serving board member form the comment letter author's 
home country during the consultation period, 0 otherwise 
CONCL 1 if the letter makes reference to the IASB's conceptual framework 
CONT 1 if the lobbyist is a known financial contributor to the IASB as reported in 
the annual report, 0 otherwise 
DISAGREE 1 if there is an occurrence of explicit disagreement 
EI_RANK_I  1 if the home country of the lobbyist ranks above the median for the mean 
rank of the ratio of the aggregate stock market capitalization to gross 
national product for the entire time period 2002-2011, scaled by ownership 
concentration obtained from La Porta et al., (2006) and the number of 
listed domestic firms per capita. 
HIDL 1 if the lobbyist is an association lobbying on behalf of members, 0 
otherwise 
IAS_DIFF 1 if the average of the absence and divergence scores from Ding et al 
(2007) is above the median, 0 otherwise.  
IG Takes 1 if the lobbyist is categorized as the interest group in question, 0 
otherwise. IG = BUS: Business community.  IG = FIN: Financial Industry. 
IG = ACC: Accountants and Auditors. IG = ACC: Academic. IG = REG: 
Regulator. IG = STN: Accounting Standard Setter. 
ISS 1 if the accounting issue in question relates to classification and 
measurement, and 0 otherwise. 
LENGTH Number of lines in the observation 
MARK The market capitalization of listed companies in the country as a 
percentage of market capitalization of listed companies in the world, in the 
year of the observation 
NEGATIVITY The modified weighted ratio of negative to non-negative words 
POSTC 1 if the observation relates to exposure drafts issued after the 
commencement of the financial crisis in 2008, 0 otherwise 
QPERC Percentage of questions posed in the exposure draft that were answered in 
the letter 
REJECT 1 if the proposed change in the exposure draft did not make it into the 
resulting amendment to the standard, 0 otherwise. 
VOLLG The natural logarithm of the number of comment letters sent to the IASB 
in response to the exposure draft 
WORDS Number of words in the letter 
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Table 1  
Sample 
Panel A: Sample Selection and exposure draft distribution 






2002 June Disclosure, Presentation, Recognition and Measurement 14 12 207 976 
2003 August Fair Value Hedge Accounting 2 2 127 118 
2004 April The Fair Value Option 6 3 116 176 
2004 July Transition and Initial Recognition 3 1 37 22 
2004 July Cash Flow Hedge Accounting 3 1 58 33 
2004 July Disclosures 10 8 106 539 
2004 November Financial Guarantee Contracts  5 4 61 155 
2006 June Puttable at Fair Value 4 4 88 214 
2007 September Exposures Qualifying for Hedge Accounting 4 3 74 160 
2008 October Improving Disclosures 8 7 89 406 
2008 December Embedded Derivatives 5 5 55 137 
2009 April Derecognition 11 0 120 0 
2009 July Classification and Measurement 15 11 246 1,404 
2010 May Fair Value Option for Financial Liabilities  10 7 138 590 
2011 January Offsetting Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities 5 0 162 0 
2011 August Mandatory effective date of IFRS 9 2 2 131 148 
Total     107 70 1815 5,078 
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Table 1, continued 
Panel B: Interest group distribution of comment letters  
    observations   
    # %  
Academic    137 2.7  
Accounting/Auditing    1,362 26.82  
Business Community    839 16.52  
Financial Industry    1,740 34.27  
Regulator    262 5.16  
Accounting standard setting body    673 13.25  
Other    65 1.28  
Total       5,078 98.72   
Table 1, panel A presents the exposure drafts, relating to financial instrument projects that have been completed, 
issued by the IASB for public comment, questions contained in the invitation to comment section, useable 
questions, the number of corresponding comment letters, and the resulting number of observations. Panel B 
shows the distribution of observations by seven stakeholder groups.  
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Table 2 








Differences   2964 question observations   2114 question observations   





0.05 0.04 0.06 
 





0.16 0 0.37 
 





0.49 0 0.5 
 





2907.51 2076 3056.79 
 





12.99 6 20.81 
 





0.43 0 0.5 
 





4.97 4.93 0.46 
 





0.03 0 0.18 
 





95.8 100 10.86 
 





1.48 1 1.6 
 





0.25 0 0.43 
 





0.18 0 0.39 
 





0.49 0 0.5 
 





6.18 4 5.04 
 





5.92 2.97 9.47 
 





0.65 1 0.48 
 





0.63 1 0.48 
 





Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for explanatory variables and control variables, where NEGATIVITY is the modified weighted ratio of negative to non-negative 
words. AGREE is 1 if there is an occurrence of explicit agreement, 0 otherwise. DISAGREE is 1 if there is an occurrence of explicit disagreement, 0 otherwise. WORDS is the 
number of words in the letter. LENGTH is the number of lines in the observation. POSTC is 1 if the observation relates to exposure drafts issued after the commencement of 
the financial crisis in 2008, 0 otherwise. VOLLG is the natural logarithm of the number of comment letters responding to the exposure draft. CONCL is 1 if the letter makes 
reference to the IASB's conceptual framework. QPERC is the percentage of questions posed in the exposure draft that were answered in the letter. BOARD_C takes 1 if there 
was a serving board member form the comment letter author's home country during the consultation period, 0 otherwise. HIDL is 1 if the lobbyist is an association lobbying 
on behalf of members, 0 otherwise. CONT is 1 if the lobbyist is a known financial contributor to the IASB as reported in the annual report, 0 otherwise. ANGLO is 1 if the 
lobbyist is from a country with Anglo-Saxon accounting tradition, 0 otherwise. VOLLG is the natural logarithm of the number of comment letters sent to the IASB in 
response to the exposure draft. IAS_DIFF is 1 if the average of the absence and divergence scores from Ding et al (2007) is above the median, 0 otherwise. MARK is the 
market capitalization of listed companies in the country as a percentage of market capitalization of listed companies in the world, in t he year of the observation. EI_RANK_I 
is 1 if the home country of the lobbyist ranks above the median for the mean rank of the ratio of the aggregate stock market capitalization to gross national product for the 
entire time period 2002-2011, scaled by ownership concentration obtained from La Porta et al., (2006) and the number of listed domestic firms per cap ita. ISS is 1 if the 
accounting issue in question relates to classification and measurement, and 0 otherwise. Distributional descriptive statistics are displayed for observations relating to 
implemented proposed changes and observations relating to proposed changes that were reject ed. The p-values of the test of differences are based on t-test for the means and 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the medians.  
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Table 3  
The effect of explicit agreement, disagreement and negative tone on the likelihood of the IASB rejecting its 
proposal, logistic regression 
NEGATIVITY 2.807*** 
  













(0.12) (1.21) (0.83) 
AGREE 
  
-0.455*** -0.383*** -0.471*** -0.472*** 
   
(-7.86) (-5.89) (-7.24) (-5.35) 
DISAGREExNEG 
     
-0.106 
      
(-0.08) 
AGREExNEG 
     
0.021 
      
(0.02) 
WORDS 
    
-0.000 -0.000 
     
(-1.46) (-1.46) 
LENGTH 
    
-0.000 -0.000 
     
(-0.31) (-0.32) 
POSTC 
    
1.092*** 1.092*** 
     
(22.13) (22.11) 
VOLLG 
    
-0.061 -0.062 
     
(-0.97) (-0.97) 
ISS 
    
-0.090 -0.090 
     
(-1.43) (-1.43) 
_cons -0.506*** -0.392*** -0.142*** -0.298*** -0.522* -0.522* 
 
(-12.36) (-11.53) (-3.77) (-5.30) (-1.79) (-1.76) 
N 5078 5078 5078 5078 5078 5078 
pseudo R-sq 0.006 0.002 0.009 0.012 0.061 0.061 
       
This table presents the output of the logistic regression (equation 2). Significance indicated by *, ** and *** for 




The effect of explicit disagreement and negative tone on the likelihood of the IASB rejecting its proposal in the 
subsample of dissenting opinions  
NEGATIVITY 2.057*** 
 




(3.40) (4.22) (3.84) (3.83) (3.12) 
DISAGREE 
 
0.069 0.012 0.116 0.114 0.074 0.082 
  
(0.79) (0.13) (1.25) (1.14) (0.73) (0.49) 
DISAGREExNEG 
     
-0.100 
       
(-0.06) 
WORDS 
   
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
(1.33) (0.68) (0.89) (0.89) 
LENGTH 
   
-0.004** -0.004* -0.004** -0.004* 
    
(-2.00) (-1.87) (-1.96) (-1.96) 
POSTC 
   
1.147*** 1.120*** 1.148*** 1.148*** 
    
(14.48) (12.98) (13.07) (13.06) 
VOLLG 
   
-0.096 -0.043 -0.178 -0.178 
    
(-1.09) (-0.44) (-1.50) (-1.50) 
CONCL 
    
-0.305* -0.337* -0.336* 
     
(-1.67) (-1.84) (-1.83) 
QPERC 
    
0.004 0.004 0.004 
     
(1.00) (1.06) (1.06) 
BOARD_C 
    
-0.011 -0.015 -0.015 
     
(-0.29) (-0.42) (-0.42) 
HIDL 
    
-0.056 -0.049 -0.049 
     
(-0.69) (-0.61) (-0.61) 
CONT 
    
0.294*** 0.289*** 0.289*** 
     
(3.23) (3.24) (3.24) 
ANGLO 
    
-0.070 -0.039 -0.039 
     
(-0.39) (-0.22) (-0.22) 
IAS_DIFF 
    
-0.005 -0.003 -0.003 
     
(-0.34) (-0.20) (-0.20) 
MARK 
    
-0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
     
(-1.51) (-1.44) (-1.44) 
EI_RANK_I 
    
0.112 0.122 0.122 
     
(1.27) (1.39) (1.39) 
ISS 
     
0.259*** 0.259*** 
      
(2.64) (2.65) 
_cons -0.295*** -0.164*** -0.297*** -0.462 -1.053* -0.595 -0.599 
 
(-5.10) (-3.48) (-4.93) (-1.10) (-1.71) (-0.91) (-0.91) 
N 2839 2839 2839 2839 2317 2317 2317 
pseudo R-sq 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.057 0.060 0.062 0.062 
This table presents the output of the logistic regression (equation 2) on the subsample, i.e. observations 
containing explicit agreement (AGREE=1) are excluded. Significance is indicated by *, ** and *** for the 10%, 




The effect of previously documented variables on the likelihood of the IASB rejecting its proposal in the more 
strictly defined subsample of dissenting opinions and split by type of accounting issue   
 
 
All issues Disclosure and other Classification and Measurement 
  coef. m.e. coef. m.e. coef. m.e. 
WORDS 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000** 0.000** 
 
(1.13) (0.73) (-1.35) (-1.40) (2.54) (2.19) 
LENGTH -0.004 -0.001 0.025*** 0.006*** -0.016*** -0.004*** 
 
(-1.48) (-1.42) (3.78) (3.41) (-3.32) (-4.34) 
POSTC 0.898*** 0.219*** 0.550** 0.137* 1.001*** 0.043*** 
 
(6.62) (6.14) (1.98) (1.93) (6.14) (5.76) 
VOLLG -0.262 -0.042 0.536 0.134 -0.922*** -0.230*** 
 
(-1.46) (-1.00) (1.56) (1.52) (-3.64) (-3.71) 
CONCL -0.026 -0.000 0.712 0.177 0.062 0.015 
 
(-0.08) (-0.00) (0.57) (0.60) (0.18) (0.16) 
QPERC 0.008 0.002 -0.005 -0.001 0.013** 0.003* 
 
(1.57) (1.40) (-0.46) (-0.44) (2.11) (1.93) 
BOARDC 0.099 0.026 -0.047 -0.012 0.191** 0.047** 
 
(1.52) (1.62) (-0.38) (-0.40) (2.48) (2.29) 
HIDL -0.039 -0.012 -0.034 -0.009 -0.084 -0.021 
 
(-0.29) (-0.35) (-0.15) (-0.13) (-0.52) (-0.48) 
CONT 0.170 0.043 -0.069 -0.017 0.341* 0.085* 
 
(1.15) (1.11) (-0.29) (-0.24) (1.71) (1.73) 
ANGLO -0.359 -0.097 0.565 0.141 -0.737** -0.184* 
 
(-1.19) (-1.23) (0.93) (0.94) (-2.13) (-1.89) 
IAS_DIFF 0.004 0.000 0.042 0.010 -0.005 -0.001 
 
(0.16) (0.08) (0.90) (0.88) (-0.15) (-0.15) 
MARK -0.007 -0.002 -0.022 -0.005 -0.001 -0.000 
 
(-0.90) (-0.94) (-1.56) (-1.56) (-0.10) (-0.09) 
EI_RANK_I 0.295** 0.07* 0.503** 0.125* 0.167 0.000 
 
(2.04) (1.90) (1.97) (1.74) (0.97) (0.92) 
ISS 0.174 .043 
    
 
(1.25) (1.22) 

















 pseudo R-sq 0.036  0.089  0.063  
This table presents coefficients and marginal effects in the more restrictive classification of dissenting opinions 
where observations exclude explicit agreement, i.e. AGREE=0 and NEGATIVITY is above the median level of 
.0668. Columns 1 and 2 represent all issues, columns 3 and 4 present results for those observations relating to 
disclosure issues and others not falling in the category "classification and measurement" which are presented in 
columns 5 and 6. Marginal effects of covariates are estimated whils t holding all other variables constant at their 
means. For binary variables, this is the discrete change from 0 to 1 and for continuous variables it is the first 
derivative of the change in REJECT with respect to the covariate. z-statistic in parentheses. Errors are clustered 
by comment letter and significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and ***. Variables are 
defined in appendix.  
 46 
Table 6 
Interest group analysis  
Panel A: Logistic regression on dissenting subsample 



































































































































             Panel B: Logistic regression on more restrictive dissenting subsample 
  IG = BUS IG = FIN IG = ACA IG = ACC IG = REG IG = STN 
 
coef. m.e. coef. m.e. coef. m.e. coef. m.e. coef. m.e. coef. m.e. 
IG 0.191 0.045 -0.419*** -0.105*** 0.039 0.010 0.125 0.031 0.794* 0.198* 0.125 0.031 
 
(1.05) (1.05) (-3.14) (-3.14) (0.10) (0.10) (0.84) (0.84) (1.86) (1.86) (0.84) (0.84) 
Controls included yes yes Yes yes yes yes 
N 1187 1187 1187 1187 1187 1187 
pseudo R-sq 0.037 0.041 0.036 0.036 0.038 0.036 
_cons 0.066 0.136 -0.165 -0.242 -0.064 -0.242 
 
(0.07) (0.14) (-0.17) (-0.25) (-0.07) (-0.25) 
This table presents the interest group analysis. Panel A shows the coefficients from the logistic regression (equation 3) inc luding interactions between negativity and interest 
group indicators on the dissenting subsample. Panel B shows the coefficients of logistic rejection and marginal effect of interest group on the probability of a proposal being 
rejected for the more restrictively categorised dissenting observations, i.e. where AGREE=0 and NEGATIVITY is above the median. z-statistic in parentheses. Errors are 
clustered by comment letter and significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***. All other variables  are defined in appendix.  
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Figure 1  
Predictive margins of negativity on the likelihood of a proposal being rejected 
Panel A: Predictive margins of NEGATIVITY 
 













0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
NEGATIVITY













0 .1 .2 .3
NEGATIVITY














0 .1 .2 .3
NEGATIVITY
DISAGREE=0 DISAGREE=1














0 .1 .2 .3
NEGATIVITY
AGREE=0 AGREE=1
Predictive Margins of AGREE with 95% CIs
 48 
Figure 2  
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